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AN INSURER'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES FOR
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
INTRODUCTION
Although liability arising from mutual promises is gov-
erned by the law of contracts,' a different situation is presented
when one unilaterally decides to act. Because such a unliateral
undertaking is not supported by consideration, it was early
recognized that such promises were unenforceable under gen-
eral contract principles. 2 However, tort law might provide a
basis for liability "if a man takes upon himself expressly to do
such a fact safely and securely, if the thing comes to any dam-
age by his miscarriage. ' '3 Tort law will not hold an individual
responsible for failing to do that which he was not required to
do; however, once a person does act he may be held liable for
performing his task poorly.4 Liability is most likely to be im-
posed when another party relies on the actor's promises and is
injured because of that reliance.5 A more difficult case is pre-
sented when the damage suffered is due to something other
than reliance.'
These concepts are especially relevant to insurance law.
7
An insurer may decide to inspect its insured's premises and
equipment even though it has no obligation to do so. If the
inspection fails to disclose a dangerous or unsafe condition and
a patron or employee is injured as a result of that condition,
the courts must decide how the theory of gratuitous assump-
tion of performance will be applied.'
This comment will focus upon the liability of an insurer for
negligent inspection of an injury-causing instrumentality.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1973).
2 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (Q.B. 1703).
3 Id. at 107. Judge Cardozo updated the principle: "It is ancient learning that one
who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty
of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922).
' Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HAv. L. Rv.
913, 914-15 (1951).
'Id. at 928.
The most relevant example is when a third party is injured because of an actor's
negligent performance of an activity undertaken for the benefit of the actor and a
second party.
7 16 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 641 § 8883 (1968).
aId.
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More specifically, examination will be directed toward cases
where the injured party alleges: (1) that the defendant insur-
ance company gratuitously undertook the responsibility of in-
specting the property of its insured; (2) that the insurer failed
to inspect properly; and (3) that the injury could have been
avoided by proper inspection.9
I. NEGLIGENT INSPECTION IN KENTUCKY
The Kentucky courts have not expressly found an insurer
liable for negligent inspection. However, several cases suggest
that, in the proper circumstances, such a holding would be
possible.
In Ward v. Pullman Car Corp.,1" the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that an injured railroad brakeman had a cause of
action against other employees who had negligently inspected
a railroad car. The Court stated, "It is not a case of mere failure
to act, but it is a case of one who was charged with the duty of
seeing that the car was safe. . . .If they had not inspected the
car at all . . . a different question would be presented."'
In Murray v. Cowherd, 12 the president of a telephone com-
pany was held personally liable for negligently inspecting a
telephone pole that subsequently fell and injured the plaintiff.
The Court indicated that "[t]here is no reason for making a
distinction between acts of commission and omission when
each involves a breach of duty."13 Once a duty of inspection is
established, a breach of the duty results in liability to those to
whom the duty runs-in this case, to third persons.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for liability
to third persons for gratuitous endeavors in section 324A."
Kentucky has not expressly followed this provision; however,
Judge Scott Reed argued for its application in a case in which
it was alleged that a design engineer had been negligent.'5 Sec-
I This focus is necessary since "[n]egligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."
F. POLLACK, LAW OF ToRTs 345 (15th ed. 1951).
' 114 S.W. 754 (Ky. 1908).
"Id. at 756.
" 147 S.W. 6 (Ky. 1912).
"Id. at 9 (quoting Haynes' Adm'rs v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. R. Co., 140 S.W.
176 (Ky. 1911)).
" For the text of § 324A, see text at note 22 infra.
"Rigsby v. Brighton Engineering Co., 464 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1970)(concurring
opinion by Reed, J., in which two judges joined).
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tion 324A provides three bases for placing liability on gratui-
tious actions and its adoption could certainly result in liability
for insurers in a large number of cases.
The issue of an insurer's liability arises often in workmen's
compensation cases." In most cases, the injured employee sues
the insurance company pursuant to a provision in the state's
workmen~s compensation law allowing suit against a third
party, other than the employer, who has caused the injury
through negligence.' 7
Bryant v. Old Republic Insurance Co."5 is the only case in
which a court has considered Kentucky's workmen's compen-
sation law in regard to the issue of negligent inspection by an
insurance company. In Bryant, miners employed by the Pea-
body Coal Company alleged that negligent inspection by the
company's compensation insurer resulted in their injury. 9 Re-
versing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that a compen-
11 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Insurer As Suable Third Party, 1969 DUKE
L. J. 1117.
1" Id. at 1118. Several states specifically exclude the insurer from liability. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §
88A.14 (West 1972) (repealed by 1972 Iowa Acts, ch. 1028, § 1); Ky. Rav. STAT. §
342.690(1) (1977) [hereinafter cited as KRS]; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.030.2 (Vernon
Supp. 1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-112 (1974); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 281.14 (1966);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-4(D) (Supp. 1975); OR. REv. STAT. § 656.018(3) (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1977); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §
3 (Vernon 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West Supp. 1977). These statutes are
very specific in terms of granting insurer immunity. For a list of statutes that contain
language which, in all likelihood, grants immunity, see Larson, supra note 16, at 1123-
26. But see Beasley v. MacDonald Eng'r Co., 249 So.2d 844 (Ala. 1971)(despite the
persuasive language of the statute, the insurer does not share the employer's immun-
ity).
Other states find no immunity for the insurance carrier. See, e.g., Stacy v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1216 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.
1963) (both decisions superseded by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1977));
Beasley v. MacDonald Eng'r Co., 249 So.2d 844 (Ala. 1971); Nelson v. Union Wire
Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1964)(applying Florida law); Fabricius v. Montgomery
Elevator Co., 121 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1963); Megge v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 206
N.W.2d 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
However, even if immunity exists, at least one court has held that a negligent third
party may obtain contribution from a compensation insurer. If a duty to inspect
properly is breached, the insurer would be considered a joint tortfeasor. See, e.g., Mays
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds,
323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963).
Is 431 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1970).
It Id.
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sation insurer did not share the employer's immunity0 and
remanded the case to the district court.2 ' Unfortunately, there
is no record of the case after remand, so Bryant gives no real
indication of how Kentucky law on negligent inspection will be
resolved.
Thus, although the Kentucky courts have not yet expressly
found liability for an insurer's negligent inspection, such a
holding is not implausible. Because such a case would be one
of first impression in Kentucky, a detailed examination of
other jurisdictions may be instructive.
H. LiAsiLrrY TO PATRONS AND EMPLOYEES FOR NEGLIGENT
INSPECTION
Most case law in this area may be analyzed in terms of
section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This
method will provide an indication of judicial acceptance and
application of the section. Although the opinions range from
literal acceptance to constructive rejection, some consensus is
evident. Section 324A provides for liability to third persons for
gratuitous services as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration to ren-
der services to another which he should recognize as neces-
sary for the protection of a third person or his things, is sub-
ject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other
to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.
22
These three elements will be discussed as they have been ap-
plied in other jurisdictions.
2 Id. at 1388.
21 Whatever effect this case may have had on Kentucky law was abrogated by
KRS § 342.690(1) (1977) which provides, in part, that "[tihe exemption from liability
given an employer by this section shall also extend to such employer's carrier."
21 Compare § 324A with § 323, which provides liability when one attempts, gratui-
tously, to render services to another, and does so negligently, but only if the actor has
(a) increased the risk of harm, or (b) induced the other to rely on the undertaking.
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A. The Undertaking of a Duty
Section 324A(b) provides for liability when one party has
"undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person." The "other" is usually the insured, so a key issue is
the extent of the insured's duty. In the compensation cases, the
duty of the employer is that of a master, i.e., he must furnish
a place of employment which is free from recognizable haz-
ards." This duty is imposed under Kentucky law.4 The duty
that an owner or possessor owes to invitees is to keep areas the
invitee is likely to visit in a condition safe enough to "use in a
manner consistent with the purpose of the invitation."
A distinct minority has made it virtually impossible for the
insurer to be considered to have assumed the insured's duty.
In deciding Gerace v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,"5 the court
felt that there should be no liability by the insurer in any
circumstance, regardless of whether there was an inspection. A
similar view is that a disclaimer in the policyv is sufficient to
bar any claim based on negligent inspection.I
One of the main issues in the assumption of duty cases is
how much of the insured's duty must be assumed by the in-
surer before a court will find an insurer liable for breach of the
duty. In Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Insurance
Co.,29 the first case to hold an insurer liable for negligent
inspection,0 the insurer was found to have assumed the in-
sured's duty to keep a boiler in safe operating condition. The
insurer not only conducted continuous safety inspections, but
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 503 (1957).
24 KRS § 338.031 (1977).
City of Madisonville v. Poole, 249 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Ky. 1952).
"264 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1966).
2 See note 50 infra for a sample disclaimer.
"In Kennard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 277 So.2d 170 (La. Ct. of App. 1973) (on
rehearing), the court noted:
From the foregoing [disclaimer in the policy] it is clear that any inspections
made by the insurer are made only in connection with the contract between
the insurer and its insured. Accordingly, we fail to comprehend how the
insurer's obligation by virtue of any inspection it may make is greater to the
plaintiff, with whom it has no contract, than it is to its insured.
Id. at 174 (emphasis added). One response to this argument is that the plaintiff had
no opportunity to contract away any obligations.
19 A. 472 (N.J. 1890).
Comment, Insurer's Liability for Negligent Performance of Voluntary Safety
Inspection, 3 Cum.-S^m. L. Ray. 118 (1972).
[Vol. 66
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also took the responsibility of repairing and maintaining the
boiler.
A similar analysis was made in Sheridan v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co."1 The city of Seattle required inspection
reports by all owners of elevators. The insurer voluntarily con-
ducted quarterly inspections and also took upon itself the job
of sending the required reports to the city. The injured plaintiff
was permitted to recover from the insurer because the court
held that the insurer had assumed the owner's duty.32 In an-
other case, when the insurer made repeated inspections and, in
addition, kept prodding the insured until its safety recommen-
dations were followed, the court found an assumption of the
insured's duty to maintain a safe place for the employees to
work.3 Thus, it appears that a duty may be imposed on the
insurer when the insurer both thoroughly inspects and makes
provision for correcting defects.
On the other hand, some jurisdictions have indicated that
numerous inspections alone are insufficient for a finding of
liability. One United States district court34 held that an insurer
owed no duty to an injured employee where the insurer lacked
the authority to compel repairs. 5
Several courts are in agreement upon the scope of inspec-
tion required for liability. In one of the most widely discussed
cases in the area of negligent inspection, Nelson v. Union Wire
Rope Corp.,36 the Illinois Supreme Court required evidence
that the insurer inspected the exact machine which caused the
injury. This concept has been used to bar recovery where the
insurer made spot inspections of the employer's plant, but
never examined the particular machinery involved 7.3 Another
31 100 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1940).
' Id. at 1031. See also Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 163 A.2d 564 (N.H.
1960), in which the insurer assumed the insured's duty by making monthly inspections
of the entire plant. Compare Viducich v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 192 A.2d
596 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963), in which an assumption of duty was found to be lacking
since the insurer had made no effort to report any findings to the insured. However,
the insurer only made one inspection, so emphasis on the insurer's not reporting its
findings would probably change if more inspections were made.
0 Andrews v. Insurance Co., 230 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). See also
Tillman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 506 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1975).
34 Clark v. Employers Mut., 297 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
3 Id. at 290.
- 199 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1964).
31 Evans v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1968).
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court barred recovery under this principle when the insurer
inspected a water heater which exploded, but did not inspect
the pipe and bushing which led to the explosion. 8
Still another element of assumption of the insured's duty
is that the person injured must be one of a class which the
inspection was intended to protect. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. 39 indicated that this requirement might have real
impact when the court held that a fireman, injured while fight-
ing a fire which was arguably the product of a negligent inspec-
tion, was not a party that the inspection was aimed at protect-
ing. However, when the district court reconsidered its opinion
it held that injury to a fireman was reasonably foreseeable and
that the inspection was thus intended to protect him as well.40
The final factor in deciding whether the insurer has as-
sumed its insured's duty to third parties involves the purpose
of the inspection." In Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp.,42 several
children were injured when the drive shaft on a school bus
broke. The insurer of the bus owner had inspected some of the
buses; however, the court held that the insurer made only one
initial inspection for the sole purpose of underwriting. The in-
surance company's internal purpose for inspecting was evi-
denced by the fact that the inspector had no special mechani-
cal training. The court held that since the inspections were
superficial in both scope and purpose they could not be the
basis for liability.43
It must be noted that section 324A deals with rendering
services to another." Arguably, when an insurer inspects for the
purpose of internal use (risk analysis), or even for the purpose
of increasing safety in order to reduce its possibility of loss, the
insurer is rendering services for its own benefit." Others con-
' Ruddy v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 288F. Supp. 315 (M.D. Pa. 1968).
1 339 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Fla.), rev'd on rehearing, 348 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Fla.
1972).
Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 348 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
, See Sims v. American Cas. Co., 206 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam,
209 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1974).
" 23 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
" Id. at 655.
" See text accompanying note 22 supra for the complete wording of § 324A.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 179 N.W.2d
864, 871 (Wis. 1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting). See generally Hartford Steam-Boiler
Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 341 So. 2d 665 (Miss. 1977).
[Vol. 66
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tend that any improvement of safety which lowers the insurer's
possibility of loss also benefits the employee or patron. So, they
argue, it is impossible to speak of inspections which benefit
only the insurer."
In Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,47 the insurer's inspec-
tion was not merely for internal purposes. The insurance com-
pany conducted a national advertising campaign claiming that
its safety programs and experts would save money for its
clients." The sales department followed up all safety recom-
mendations of the company to make certain that suggestions
were being implemented. The court noted that "it appears be-
yond a shadow of a doubt that the services gratuitously given
by the engineers were not soley for the defendant's own pur-
pose,"49 and found that the insurer had assumed the insured's
duty.
Thus, factors to consider when determining whether an
insurer has assumed the duty of an insured are: 1) The amount
of "inspecting" done. Did the insurer make repairs, report its
findings, make recommendations? 2) The scope of the inspec-
tion. Did the insurer inspect the exact cause of the injury? 3)
The class of persons to which the injured person belongs.
Would proper inspection have protected this plaintiff?. 4) The
purpose of the inspection. Was the insurer's purpose to prevent
this particular sort of injury?
Insurance companies often reserve the right to inspect in
a permissive inspection clause. The clauses generally provide
for a permissive right of inspection without obligation to do so
and without any warranty of safety." No court has allowed a
" Sims v. American Cas. Co., 206 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974). Cf. Hartford
Steam-Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 F. 617 (7th Cir. 1912);
Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich 1965), aff'd per
curiam, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967).
199 N.E.2d 768,776 (Ill. 1964).
"Id.
" Id.
' A sample clause provides:
The Company shall be permitted but not obligated to inspect the named
insured's property and operations at any time. Neither the Company's right
to make inspections nor the making thereof nor any report thereon shall
constitute an undertaking, on behalf of or for the benefit of the named
insured or others, to determine or warrant that such property or operation
are safe.
Hassan v. Hartford Ins. Group, 373 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. Del. 1974).
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finding of liability when an insurer who had such a right failed
to inspect;51 some type of inspection is required to convert the
right to a duty.
B. Increasing the Risk of Harm
Of all the elements of section 324A, the least used for im-
posing liability is that which holds the insurer responsible if,
by failing to exercise due care, the risk of harm to a third person
is increased.52 The illustration to this section involves an em-
ployee of an electric company called to fix a defective light in
a store. After repairing the light, the worker leaves it insecurely
attached. Later, the light falls on one of the store's customers.
The section seems to apply only when the actor has made it
more likely that some sort of harm will result. Seldom in the
area of safety inspection does an insurer make the situation
more dangerous. Some writers contend that when the insured
foregoes inspections because the insurer has undertaken them,
then the repairs the insured would have made are not made
and the situation, in reality, is worse. 3 However, this reasoning
does not seem to be applicable to the risk of harm concept, but
is more appropriate to the reliance theory.
Hassan v. Hartford Insurance Group55 illustrates the diffi-
culty of holding insurers liable on the theory that they in-
creased the risk of harm by conducting inspections. The dece-
dent in this action was the victim of a fire in a motel where fire
safety code violations allegedly existed. One theory advanced
by the plaintiff was that the hotel's insurer, through negligent
inspection of the premises, increased the risk of harm to the
decedent. The court rejected the contention, noting:
1, E.g., Mann v. Highland Ins. Co., 461 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1972); Hassan v. Hart-
ford Ins. Group, 373 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1974); Clark v. Employers Mut., 297 F.
Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Bartolotta v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn.
1967); Thompson v. National Press Corp., 264 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1966); Kennard
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1973); American Mut. Liabl.
Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 179 N.W.2d 864 (Wis. 1970); Van Winkle
v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 19 A. 472 (N.J. 1890).
52 See text accompanying note 22 supra for the actual wording of § 324A(a).
3 J. APPLEMA & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 7, at 641.
See text accompanying notes 57-77 infra for a discussion of the reliance theory.
373 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1974).
[Vol. 66
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There is no fact alleged or even a remote suggestion that [the
insurer] directed or altered the operation of the motel in any
manner so as to make the motel more hazardous to the dece-
dent. If any risk existed it existed independently of any un-
dertaking by [the insurer].56
Following this reasoning, few courts could be faced with situa-
tions where liability could be based on increasing the risk of
harm through negligent inspection.
C. Liability Based on Reliance
The third principle embodied in section 324A is that liabil-
ity can be based upon reliance on the actions of the insurer.
57
The main questions which must be answered before reliance
can be found are: First, is reliance a necessary finding in
inspection cases, and, next, who must rely on the insurer's
activities?
While refusing to take a position itself, the court in
Winslett v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. 5  noted that the fed-
eral courts seem to require reliance on the insurer's inspections
by the plaintiff or the insured before liability can be found.
However, this statement does not appear to be supported by
the case law. Although the court in Viducich v. Greater New
York Mutual Insurance Co. 5  stated that reliance was
"essential," that term appeared to mean something less than
mandatory. 0 One court did require an instruction on reliance
to be submitted to the jury even though the plaintiff based his
claim on the theory that the insurer had assumed the duty of
the insured." However, that same court thereafter reversed its
position and held that, when one of the other two theories in
section 324A is urged, an instruction on reliance is not neces-
sary.6
2
" Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).
" See text accompanying note 22 supra where § 324A (c), the reliance section, is
set out.
"232 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
192 A.2d 596 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963). For the argument that reliance is a neces-
sity, see Comment, The Workmen's Compensation Insurance Carrier As a Third
Party Tort-Feasor, 1 CoNN. L. REv. 183 (1968).
11 192 A.2d at 601.
4t Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973), overruled
by Olkowski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 220 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
a Olkowski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 220 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
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The cases which hold that reliance is unnecessary are more
numerous and enjoy a more logical footing. It must be noted
that section 324A is phrased in the disjunctive;3 any one of the
three theories or any combination will be sufficient to state a
claim. In Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,"0 recovery was
based on the insurer's assumption of the insured's duty to keep
a reasonably safe workplace. Reliance was held to be unneces-
sary.
66
As a practical matter, reliance may be an absolute neces-
sity. Given the scrutiny which some courts use in determining
whether the insurer has assumed all of the insured's duty," and
realizing the difficulty of showing an increase in the risk of
harm,68 reliance may be the only theory left for the plaintiff to
use.
Although section 324A(c) mentions "reliance of the other
or third person,"69 a few courts require a showing of reliance by
a particular party. The Supreme Court of Vermont rejected
liability when there was no evidence that the plaintiff had
relied on the insurer's inspections. Another court made reli-
ance on the undertaking by the policy holder the sine qua non.'
The better and more accepted view is that liability can be
based on reliance by either the insured or the plaintiff. Since
the theory behind reliance is that someone relied upon the
insurer's actions and representations, and that an injury oc-
curred as a result thereof, it should make no difference who
acted in reliance.72
See text accompanying note 22 supra where § 324A is set out.
" Corson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 265 A.2d 315 (N.H. 1970).
199 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1964).
"Id. at 778. See also Sims v. American Cas. Co., 206 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 209 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1974), where reliance was simply a factor
in finding negligence.
'" See text accompanying notes 23-49 supra for a discussion of the "assumption
of duty" cases.
" See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra in which this difficulty is examined.
" Emphasis is added. As pointed out in the text accompanying note 22 supra, the
Restatement does not mandate one particular selection.
11 Steele v. Eaton, 285 A.2d 749 (Vt. 1971). See also Evans v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 288 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd, 398 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1968).
7, Clark v. Employers Mut., 297 F. Supp. 286, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
72 Hill v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971). What the court gave with one hand, i.e., allowing either
[Vol. 66
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The injured party has a difficult time showing his reli-
ance.7 3 Because the third-party employee or patron rarely
knows the insurer is inspecting, there are few cases where the
plaintiff can show that he relied upon inspections for his safety.
It is also more convenient to focus on the insured's reliance
because such reliance can be evidenced by the insured's ac-
tions. Logically, in situations where the insured's property has
been totally destroyed, the insured is less reluctant to agree
that he did, in fact, rely on the insurer's inspections.
Prima facie evidence that the insured has relied on the
insurer's inspections has been found when the insured lessened
its own safety program once the insurer started inspecting.74
This evidence can be countered by showing that, despite the
fact the insured changed its safety patterns, there was no ac-
tual reliance. For example, when the insurer inspects and
makes recommendations for improving safety standards, and
the insured continually rejects such suggestions, then it can
hardly be said that the insured relied on the insurance com-
pany's inspections.75 In addition, those courts which accept the
"internal purpose" concept" are willing to find that there can
be no reliance when the inspections are for such purposes.77
CONCLUSION
Theoretically, in a suit to determine the liability of an
insurance company for conducting negligent inspections, the
jury has no part to play in deciding whether the defendant was
party to rely, it took away with the other. Taking a distinctively minority position, the
court held:
If reliance is a prerequisite to liability, the insurer may substantially protect
itself in its safety undertakings, and at the same time protect users of the
premises who may be the victims of lack of performances, by making unam-
biguously clear to the insured either that it can rely or that it must not rdly.
Id. at 120.
Contra, Comment, supra note 59.
7' Tillman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 506 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1975); Stacy v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973).
" Watson v. Employers Ins. Co., 213 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
76 See text accompanying notes 41-49 supra for a discussion of the "internal pur-
pose" concept. Internal purposes include an initial inspection for the purpose of deter-
mining whether to insure the client; inspections designed to reduce the risk of loss by
the insurer; and inspections to provide underwriting information.




legally bound to protect some interest or right of the plaintiff."
When a judge submits to the jury the issue of negligence simply
because he feels that the resolution of the duty issue is not
clear, the jury may assume that there was a duty or else the
judge would never have submitted the negligence issue at all.79
Given the recognized bias of juries against insurance compa-
nies and large corporations,"0 the case may be decided simply
by submitting the issue of duty to the jury. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the court to consider the issue of duty care-
fully and come to a conclusion prior to submission of the negli-
gence issue to the jury.
The Wisconsin legislature decided that the public could
best be served by granting insurers immunity from liability for
negligent inspection." However, this type of "legislative atten-
tion" 2 is probably constitutionally impermissible in Ken-
tucky. 3 Since the legislature is constitutionally prevented from
implementing an arguably valid public policy, i.e., encourag-
ing insurers to inspect by limiting their liability, there is even
more reason for a court to examine the facts closely before
finding a duty on the part of the insurer to the injured person.
The courts are the only means of instituting this policy, if it is
desirable at all.
This comment has briefly discussed the complexities nec-
essarily faced in deciding whether a duty was owed by the
inspector to a third party. Several key factors emerge from the
existing case law.
Focusing first on the reaction of the insured to the inspec-
tion, reliance and duty are more likely to be found when the
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 37 (4th ed. 1971).
, Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928).
Finch v. Conley, 422 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1967).
SI Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.44 (West 1966). It is questionable whether this statute is
constitutional under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Constitution guarantees:
Every person has [the right] to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries,
or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property, or character; he
ought to obtain justice freely, and without denial, promptly and without
delay, conformably to the laws.
WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 9. For a discussion of constitutionality, see Comment, Wisconsin's
"Good Samaritan" Statute, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 80 (1964).
0 Larson, supra note 16, at 1143.
0 Ky. CONST. § 54 provides:
The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be re-
covered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.
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insured discontinued his safety program after the insurer began
inspecting. The same result is probable if the insured did not
completely discontinue his program but simply reduced it by
a sufficient degree. The reaction of the insured is the most
important factor in determining the applicability of the reli-
ance theory.
Receiving equal attention will be the conduct of the in-
surer. An initial factor will be the purpose of the inspection. If
the inspection is solely for internal purposes and on a limited
basis, a duty is less likely to be found. Another important ele-
ment will be whether open and obvious conditions were in-
spected. If so, a court might restrict liability to harm following
from those conditions.
A final and perhaps most important consideration deals
with the character of the inspection. If the insurer makes repre-
sentations as to the efficiency of its program, coupled with high
safety credentials of its inspectors, liability will be more likely.
The authority to enforce recommendations will also help estab-
lish the existence of a duty. By the same token, the absence of
these considerations will also lead to a finding of no duty.
While no rigid formula can be utilized, the analysis of the
above factors should present the court with a fairly good indica-
tion of the insurer's duty, if any, to the plaintiff. The jury, on
the other hand, should focus on questions of fact. Were there
any inspections? What would a reasonable inspection have
discovered? Did the defect which led to the accident occur
between the last inspection and the injury? 4
As a basis for liability, the concept of negligent inspection
is gaining momentum. While no one supports a wrongdoer es-
caping liability, it is necessary for the court to consider care-
fully whether a wrongdoer is before the court at all. Kentucky
law is in a virginal state regarding the theory of negligent
inspections. The courts should use the opportunity to balance
public policy with the rights of injured parties.
Michael Braden
u See, e.g., Winslett v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 232 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977).
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